Qatar and the GCC Dispute
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a socio-cultural, political as well as an economic organization (Mohamed, 2012).The current research paper will delve into the recent dispute pitting Qatar against three GCC countries – KSA, UAE and Bahrain. Afterwards, the paper will examine the withdrawal of KSA, UAE and Bahrain diplomats from Qatar. Moreover, the research paper will analyze the rationale behind the withdrawal of Bahraini, Emirati and Saudi envoys from Qatar. This research paper will provide a succinct explanation of the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood with Qatar. In addition, this essay will provide an examination into the role of Yusuf al-Qaradawi played in severing links between these countries. The next issue to consider is the role of Qatar-based al-Jazeera media in abetting radicalization. Finally, the paper will elucidate the role the Riyadh and Doha summits together with that of Sheikh Sabah from Kuwait in resolving the dispute.
The Arab uprisings culminated to fragmentation of the GCC (Al-Khouri, 2013). The UAE, Bahrain and KSL announced their withdrawal of envoys from Qatar. The announcement confirmed that Qatar had become an enfrant terrible to GCC monarchies due to its avant-garde and contentious eccentric behavior tailored to annoy other GCC nations. No clear reasons were given in justifying the unprecedented move. Only security and stability reasons were mentioned as possible causes of the withdrawal. However, the Saudi-sponsored media attributed the withdrawal to hidden machinations of Qatar against the three countries. The three countries professed their attempts to persuade Qatar to tailor its policies towards the Arab region to the GCC’s guiding principles. The three nations urged Qatar to quit supporting the Muslim Brotherhood as well as to halt being aninitiation pad for activists and dissidents in the Arab world (Legrenzi, 2011). KSL aimed at supporting monarchy in Jordan, Morocco and the GCC nations as well as resisting the Arab uprising.On the other hand, Qatar supported revolutionary forces, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Qatar defied KSL in Northern Africa. KSL argued that this threatened the stability and security of GCC. Qatar became a safe haven for most Islamist groups. Qatar could not accept subservience to KSL hegemony. As a result, KSL enticed UAE and Bahrain to sever links with Qatar to ostracize Qatar. KSL was keen to stop Qatar from becoming the main arbiter within the Arab world. Indeed, Qatar threatened KSL’s hegemony in the Arab region by usurping its role as the major arbiter.
Kuwaiti emir Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmed Sabah urged Arab leaders to embrace reconciliation efforts to realize unity. Sheikh Sabah sought closer ties between Arabian Gulf countries and Doha over Egypt. Qatar supported Mohammed Morsi of Muslim Brotherhood. Morsi was elected as a President. However, the military removed him after mass protests. In March 2014, UAE, KSL and Bahrain withdrew their envoys from Qatar after supporting the Muslim Brotherhood. Qatar did not pull out her ambassadors from the three countries. After Morsi’s removal, KSL and the UAE gave financial resources to Egypt’s new rulers who cracked down the Muslim Brotherhood. Sheikh Sabah sought to reconcile the GCC states and Qatar by taking an immense role in smoothing the tensions. During the GCC Summit, Sheikh Sabah tried to reconcile KSL’s Crown Prince Salman and Qatar’s Sheikh Tamin. Sheikh Sabah’s mediation role led to the signing of the trilateral Riyadh agreement tailored to terminate proxy relationships as well as policies injurious to GCC states (Ramady, 2014).
Yusuf al-Qaradawi is Doha’s firebrand cleric and a Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader (Gräf & Skovgaard-Petersen, 2009). He questioned the Islamic pedigree of the UAE. He criticized leaders who advocated the removal of Morsi from power. According to Abdel Bari, the editor-in-chief of Rai al-Youm, KSL, UAE and Bahrain withdrew their envoys from Qatar as an eventual and immediate measure following al-Qaradawi’s speech (Gräf & Skovgaard-Petersen, 2009). Qatar and the UAE have been long-time rivals in major sectors of the regional economy. Therefore, the bashing of GCC countries by al-Qaradawi exacerbated the situation. Qatar hosted Islamist activists from Egypt. Qatari-owned Al Jazeera’s resources were used in putting them in hotels and provide them with other accommodation services. Moreover, Al Jazeera resources broadcasted the Islamist activists on television (TV). Qatari used Yusuf al-Qaradawi to deliver sermons to Qataris and Egyptians. His teachings in mosques as well as onAl Jazeera TV are partly to blame for KSL, Bahrain and the UAE’s decision to withdraw their envoys from Doha. They demanded that Qatar expels al-Qaradawi after delivering critical sermons against the UAE and KSL. Moreover, the continued hosting of Muslim Brotherhood by Qatar angered the three GCC countries (Zahid, 2010).
Bahrain criticized Qatar for giving Sunni nationals outright citizenship. Like Qatar, Bahrain has a Sunni population. However, the Shiites constitutes the majority. Therefore, giving Bahraini Sunnis the citizenship exacerbated the demographic imbalance between the two countries. Qatar requires Bahraini Sunnis to denounce their initial citizenship before receiving Qatari citizenship. Bahrain argues such a practice is unfriendly since enticing Bahrainis to cede their nationality is unfair. The illegal procedures adopted by Qatar have resulted to arrests of Bahrainis with Qatari passports. Bahrain holds that it is mandatory for a Bahraini to seek authorization before taking another citizenship (Joyce, 2012). However, some Shiites have accused Bahrain of giving citizenship to many Sunnis from other countries. Three years after dismantling the Shiite-dominated movement, Bahrain’s still remains divided.
The GCC summit was convened in Riyadh on November 16, 2014 in Riyadh, KSL. Bahrain, KSL, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE leaders attended the summit. Qatari’s Sheikh al-Thani thanked King Abdullah especially with his role in ending the dispute. The three GCC nations resolved the 8-month dispute with Qatar on November 2014. They sent their envoys back to Doha. This move was welcomed by most people paving way for the yearly GCC summit that took place on December 9-10, 2014 in Doha. The Gulf leaders resolved to ensure stability even with the several political and economic challenges facing the GCC.Policies were laid down that will create some new order and strategic order within the Arab world. This would help in reinvigorating the Arab position within the global real politik. The Doha summit fulfilled the decision in the Riyadh summit held in November 2014. The summit helped in overcoming doubts, which marred the relationship between the UAE, KSL, Bahrain and Qatar together with Oman. The relationship with Egypt took centre stage during the Doha summit. This fulfilled King Abdullah’s appeals during the Riyadh summit to address to issue of Muslim Brotherhood and Qatar. KSL and the UAE supported Egypt’s pivotal and central role within the Arab world. The December 2014 Doha summit also resolved to reach out to Iran to encourage her to espouse moderation. Notably, the ambassadors returned after the Riyadh Summit (Ramady, 2014).
In conclusion, KSL and the UAE argued that Muslim Brotherhood was a terrorist group supported by Qatar. They also see Al Jazeera as a mouthpiece for the Muslim Brotherhood. After the Doha summit, Qatar promised to deny the group a chance to operate within the country. Essentially, the Doha summit sought to curb Islamic extremism as well as the plunging prices of oil. The Gulf monarchies’ leaders also discussed the unrest in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. KSL banned the local Al Jazeera office for supporting the Muslim Brotherhood. Both the Riyadh and Doha summits helped in alleviating the stalemate pitting Qatar against KSL, Bahrain and the UAE. This research paper has also demonstrated that the support of Muslim Brotherhood and the teachings of Yusuf al-Qaradawi in al-Jazeera TV did not augur well with the three GCC countries. Moreover, Bahrain accused Qatar of giving citizenship to Bahraini Sunnis. Lastly, the research paper has shown that Sheikh Sabah played a great role in negotiations between the KSL, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE.
References
Al-Khouri, M. (2013). Critical thoughts from a government mindset. Oxford: Chartridge Books Oxford.
Gräf, B., & Skovgaard-Petersen, J. (2009).Global mufti: The phenomenon of Yūsufal-Qaraḍāwi ̄. New York: Columbia University Press.
Joyce, M. (2012).Bahrain from the twentieth century to the Arab Spring. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Legrenzi, M. (2011).The GCC and the international relations of the Gulf: Diplomacy, security and economic coordination in a changing Middle East. London: I.B. Tauris.
Martin, L. G. (1984). The unstable gulf: Threats from within. Lexington: Lexington Books.
Mohamed A. R. (2012). The GCC economies: Stepping up to future challenges. New York: Springer.
Ramady, M. A. (2014). Political, economic and financial country risk: Analysis of the gulf cooperation council. Cham: Imprint: Springer.
Zahid, M. (2010). The muslim brotherhood and Egypt’s succession crisis: The politics of liberalisation and reform in the middle east. London: Tauris Academic Studies.
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